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(RE-)GRASPING THE OPPORTUNITY INTEREST: LEHR V.
ROBERTSON AND THE TERMINATED PARENT
By LaShanda Taylor Adams*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1997, an Ohio court terminated Peggy Fugate’s parental rights to her sixyear-old daughter, Selina. At the time, Ms. Fugate, an incarcerated drug abuser,
did not fight the order, believing her daughter would be adopted into a clean,
stable home.1 However, Selina was never adopted. For the next seven years,
Selina had trouble with the police and ran away from her foster home numerous
times.
While Selina’s life was going downhill in many respects, her mother was
rehabilitating. She entered recovery, married, obtained full-time employment
and was living in stable housing with enough room for her daughter.
Recognizing the strides that Ms. Fugate had made, the juvenile court allowed
Selina to visit her. Wanting some legal recognition of the parent-child
relationship that they had now developed, in 2003, Ms. Fugate petitioned the
court for custody of Selina.
While the lower courts found no bar to Ms. Fugate’s custody petition, the
Supreme Court of Ohio held that “a parent who has lost permanent custody of a
child does not have standing as a nonparent to file a petition for custody for that
child.”2 The judges, in issuing the opinion, empathized with Selina and made it
clear that the decision was based solely on the current understanding of the law,
stating: “[W]e recognize that Selina’s situation is not ideal . . . . In denying
standing to [her mother] . . . we are following the statute as written.”3
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1. In re McBride, 850 N.E.2d 43, 44 (Ohio 2006).
2. Id. at 47.
3. Id.
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At the conclusion of the case, Selina was left in legal limbo- one of over
3,033 children under legal guardianship of the State of Ohio due to the
termination of their biological parents’ rights.4 Despite having a biological
mother who was willing and able to care for her, Selina exited the foster care
system as a legal orphan – a youth without legal parents.5 The court’s decision
not only deprived Selina of the emotional, financial and legal support that a
parent-child relationship provides, it deprived Ms. Fugate of the chance to regrasp her opportunity interest in her daughter.
Unfortunately, Selina and Ms. Fugate are not alone. Nearly 59,000 legallyfree youth in the United States foster care system are waiting to be adopted.6
Some of these youth have biological parents who have rehabilitated and can
provide care for them,7 but the prevailing view that the parents are legal strangers
to their children – persons with no legal rights or responsibilities – creates
unnecessary roadblocks in their attempt to regain custody.8
This article seeks to eliminate that barrier by relying on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Lehr v. Robertson to assert that terminated parents retain an
opportunity interest in their un-adopted biological children and cannot be
prohibited from “re-grasping” that interest. As such, states must clearly set forth
a process by which the interest can be converted into a legally-recognized right.
Currently, parents in 19 states can look to state reinstatement statutes for such a
4. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CHILD WELFARE
OUTCOMES 2003-2006 (2010), available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cwo0306/cwo03-06.pdf.
5. 47 AM. JUR. 2D Juvenile Courts, Etc. § 63 (2008) (defining a “legal orphan” as a child
whose parents’ rights have been terminated, but has not yet been adopted). The term “legal
orphan,” in the sense in which it is used in this article, seems to have been originated by Professor
Martin Guggenheim. See Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the
Termination of Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care – An Empirical Analysis in Two States,
29 FAM. L.Q. 121 (1995).
6. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT #21 (2014), available
at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport21.pdf [hereinafter AFCARS REPORT
#21]. There over 100,000 youth in the United States foster care system waiting to be adopted.
7. It is impossible to estimate the number of biological parents who would be suitable
caretakers for their children if permitted post-termination reunification. However, some cases have
been reported. See Kendra Hurley, When You Can’t Go Home, 15 CHILD WELFARE WATCH 18,
20 (2008) (showing uncertainty in the number of reversed parental rights in New York prior to
enactment of the restoration statute. One child advocate approximates the total number to be in the
hundreds while others estimate the number to be less than ten); Barbara White Stack, Teen in Flight
in the Public Care System but on the Lam, 14-year-old Longs for Someone Who Cares,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Sept. 12, 2004), http://www.post-gazette.com/frontpage/2004/09/12
/In-the-public-care-system-but-on-the-lam-a-teen-longs-for-someone-who-cares/stories
/200409120205 (showing that parental rights have been restored in Pennsylvania, which does not
have a restoration statute); Brothers' Case to Petition for Parental Rights will go to Trial, KOMO
NEWS, (Sept. 17, 2007), http://www.komonews.com/news/local/9840602.html (last visited Aug.
25, 2015) (discussing first case filed under Washington reinstatement statute).
8. See, e.g., In re the Dependency of G.C.B, 870 P.2d 1037 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994), Ex rel.
R.N.R.R., 2007 WL 2505629 (Tex. App. 2007), In re John Santosky, 161 A.D.2d 908 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1990), Tiffany A. v. Margaret H., 171 Misc.2d 786 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1996), In re T.C., 759
N.Y.S.2d 295 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2003).
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process.9 However, this article sets forth reasons why those laws are legally
insufficient.
To provide context, the article begins with a discussion of the constitutional
rights of parents to the care, custody and control of their children, how those
rights are terminated, and the consequences of termination. Section IV
introduces the concept of a retained opportunity interest and explains how that
interest can be re-grasped. Lastly, Section V discusses how amending the
federal Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA)10 to include post-termination
reunification as a permanency option will satisfy the constitutional mandate.
II.

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

The Supreme Court has identified specific categories of rights that are
protected by the Constitution, including the fundamental right to the care,
custody and control of one’s children. Though not articulated in the United
States Constitution, the right of parents to direct the education and upbringing
of their children has been continuously upheld by the Supreme Court, starting in
1923 with Meyer v. Nebraska.11 Since that time, the constitutional status of
parenthood has continued to develop. “This Court’s decisions have by now
made plain beyond the need for multiple citation that a parent’s desire for and
right to ‘the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her
children’ is an important interest that ‘undeniably warrants deference and, absent
a powerful countervailing interest, protection.’”12
When a countervailing state interest does exist, parents are entitled to due
process before the state can interfere with the parent-child relationship. If the
level of care being provided by the parent fails to meet established standards, the
parens patriae authority of the state enables it to intervene.13 Intervention
begins with an agency response to a report of suspected child abuse or neglect
and can include adjudication, disposition, termination of parental rights and
adoption hearings.
If the court finds the child to be abused or neglected, in many cases, the
child is placed in the custody of the state, which then decides where the child
will live. When a child is in the custody of the state and before parental rights
are terminated, biological parents retain “residual parental rights and
responsibilities.”14 These rights include the right to visit, consent to adoption,
make major medical and educational decisions, and determine religious

9. Unless permitted to move the court for post-termination visitation, terminated parents are
hampered in their ability to re-establish their parental rights. See Section IV(B)(2)(b).
10. 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(h) (2015).
11. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
12. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
13. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972).
14. Those rights and responsibilities remaining with the parent after transfer of legal custody
or guardianship. See, e.g., D.C. CODE §16-2301(22) (2012).
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affiliation.15 Residual responsibilities include the responsibility to pay child
support.16
Once the court decides that the family cannot be preserved and the child
cannot safely return home, every state provides a statutory mechanism for the
involuntary termination of parental rights.17 Because all other rights have
already been taken from the parent, the issue before the court at a termination
proceeding is whether residual parental rights should be terminated. To prevail
in a termination of parental rights proceeding, the state must prove by at least
clear and convincing evidence18 that the parent is “unfit” and that termination is
in the child’s best interest.19
III.

LEGAL ORPHANS

There is no guarantee, however, that a child will be adopted after his
parents’ rights have been terminated20 and states have minimal insight into when
a termination will lead to an adoption. Research shows that between 10% and
25% of anticipated adoptions do not finalize.21 When a pre-adoptive placement
disrupts and permanent legal connections are not created, the youth is left in
legal limbo.22 In his article The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Rebecca E. Hatch, Cause of Action for Termination of Parental Rights Based on
Abuse or neglect, 53 CAUSE OF ACTION 2D 523 (2012) (finding that actions for the termination of
parental rights in the context of abuse, neglect, or dependency proceedings are the centerpiece of
the child welfare adjudication system).
In most states only the state has standing to seek termination of parental rights; however, some
states grant standing to individuals, including those seeking to adopt the child. See, e.g., DKM v.
RJS, 924 P.2d 985, 988 (Wyo. 1996).
18. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982).
19. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS (2007), available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs
/groundtermin.pdf.
20. See Parkinson, infra note 189, at 159 (expressing concern over the number of children in
the United States who have had parental rights terminated, but have not found alternative families
to provide long term care).
21. Hurley, supra note 4, at 19 (citing national studies). One study found that the most
frequent reasons for ambivalence regarding adoption are: lack of resources to meet the child’s needs
(28%), loss of financial support (20%), loss of casework services or support (19%), family not
ready (18%), and child’s behavior (17%). See Gretta Cushing & Sarah B. Greenblatt, Vulnerability
to Foster Care Drift After the Termination of Parental Rights, 19 RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 694,
699 (2009). See also Rosemary J. Avery, Perceptions and Practice: Agency Efforts for the
Hardest-to-Place Children, 22 CHILD. & YOUTH SERV. REV. 399, 408 (2000) (finding that the
major reasons for the disruption of an adoptive placement to be: child’s behavior, foster parents’
inability to provide services, abuse by foster parents or other children in the pre-adoptive home,
reappearance of a birth parent, and reconsideration by foster parents). When the family with whom
the child was living at the time of the termination proceeding does not adopt, the likelihood of
adoption is reduced by 66%. See Gretta Cushing & Sarah B. Greenblatt, Vulnerability to Foster
Care Drift After the Termination of Parental Rights, 19 RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 694, 701 (Nov.
2009).
22. AFCARS trends indicate that when waiting children reach between 8 and 9 years old,
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Termination of Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care – An Empirical
Analysis in Two States, Martin Guggenheim began referring to these youth as
“legal orphans.”23 Studies have concluded that the loss of the legal relationship
can mean a loss of the physical and emotional relationship between the parent
and child, which is important to their social and emotional development.24
“Children who age out of the foster care system without permanent homes or
legal connections experience dire outcomes in an array of well-being indicators,
including homelessness, criminal involvement, mental and physical health,
education level, and reliance on public assistance. These problems are
particularly acute for the legal orphans who are not adopted and who exit the
foster care system through emancipation at the age of 18 or 21.”25 Currently,
nationwide, there are approximately 59,000 legal orphans in the foster care
system.26
On the state level, the “legal orphan problem” has been recognized by
legislatures, judges and child advocates. In 2012, the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges (NCJFCJ) issued a “Resolution Calling for
Judicial Action to Reduce the Number of Legal Orphans at Risk of Aging Out
of Foster Care in the United States.”27 That resolution acknowledges that “all
50 states have what the federal government calls ‘legal orphans’ aging out of
foster care each year” and resolved that “every child should have a permanent,
legal relationship with a caring and safe adult.”28 It further resolves that “the
NCJFCJ recommends that judges exercise frequent and diligent judicial
they are more likely to continue to wait for a family than be adopted. More than one quarter of the
youth waiting for adoption are between the ages of 13 and 17. Data suggest, however, that youth
who enter foster care as teenagers are highly unlikely to be adopted. Studies conclude that the
absence of a legal parent has negative social, emotional, and financial effects. See LaShanda
Taylor, Un-Terminating Parental Rights: Resurrecting Parents of Legal Orphans, 17 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 318 (2010).
23. Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of
Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care – An Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L.Q.
121 (1995).
24. There is a connection between loss due to foster care placement, termination of parental
rights and negative behaviors in children. “Children who experience such losses may be
particularly vulnerable to angry behavior and disrespect toward adults and are at risk of falling into
a cycle of negative behavior and weakened connections with adults.” Marcy Viboch, Childhood
Loss and Behavioral Problems: Loosening the Links, VERA INST. JUST. Dec. 2005, at 5 available
at
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/Childhood_loss.pdf
(citing
Francine Cournos, The Trauma of Profound Childhood Loss: A Personal and Professional
Perspective, 73 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 145 (2002)). Studies further reveal that ties to extended family
are integral to the development of cultural and personal identity as well as emotional well-being.
R.S. Eagle, The Separation Experience of Children in Long Term Care: Theory, Research, and
Implications for Practice. 64 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 421 (1994).
25. Taylor, supra note 22, at 328–29.
26. AFCARS REPORT #21, supra note 6, at 1. See also Appendix A.
27. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, RESOLUTION CALLING
FOR JUDICIAL ACTION TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF LEGAL ORPHANS AT RISK OF AGING OUT OF
FOSTER CARE IN THE UNITED STATES (2012), available at http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files
/Resolution_LegalOrphans_fnl-3-21-12.pdf.
28. Id. at 1.
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oversight to ensure that the child does not remain a legal orphan and that the
child achieves permanency” and calls for judicial action to reduce the number
of legal orphans in foster care.29 One way to reduce the number of legal orphans
is by recognizing the opportunity interest that the terminated parent retains and
by allowing that interest to be “re-grasped” when in the child’s best interest.
IV.

A.

“RE-GRASPING” THE POST-TERMINATION OPPORTUNITY
INTEREST

The Post-Termination Opportunity Interest 30

Since 1923, the rights of parents vis-à-vis their biological children has
continued to develop. In the 1983 case Lehr v. Robertson, the United States
Supreme Court drew a clear distinction between a parental right and an
opportunity interest.31 A parental right is afforded constitutional protection; an
opportunity interest is not. In Lehr, a putative father argued that the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment gave him an
absolute right to notice and an opportunity to be heard before his child could be
adopted.32 The Court determined that, since the father had not established a
custodial, personal or financial relationship with the child, no parental right was
created.33 As such, he was not entitled to any due process.
The Supreme Court determined that a biological parent, by virtue of
biology, possesses an interest in having an opportunity to enjoy a relationship
with her children. That interest can be converted to a parental right as a result
of her actions. “The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the
natural [parent] an opportunity that no other [person] possesses to develop a
relationship with his [or her] offspring. If he [or she] grasps that opportunity
and accepts some measure of responsibility for his [or her] child’s future, he [or
she] may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely
valuable contributions to the child’s development.”34 The parental right, once
created, can only be terminated by death, relinquishment or involuntary
termination.35 While the right can be terminated by these means, relinquishment
29. Id.
30. See Appendix C.
31. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983). In their book Beyond the Best Interest of
the Child, Goldstein, Freud and Solnit define “opportunity interest” as the interest in developing
the important psychological parent-child relationship by continuous parental nurturing of the child.
J. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 11 (1973). An opportunity
interest has also been defined as “the claim made on the strength of the biological connection
alone.” Elizabeth Buchanan, The Parent-Child Relationship and the Current Cycle of Family Law
Reform: The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 OHIO
ST. L.J. 313, 352 (1984) (examining constitutional attitudes toward the parent-child relationship).
32. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 248.
33. Id. at 262.
34. Id.
35. In re B.C., 582 A.2d 1196, 1199 (D.C. 1990) ("parental responsibilities do not terminate
absent the death of the parent or a court order."); see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-220(a) (Repl.
2009).
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and involuntary termination have no effect on the opportunity interest. As the
Lehr court stated, “the actions of judges neither create nor sever genetic
bonds.”36 Thus, terminated parents retain the inherent opportunity interest
afforded to them by the “biological connection.”
The opportunity interest exists before a parent develops an enduring
relationship with the child and is present even when no such relationship is
established. To permit the parent to develop a relationship/parental right,
biological parents are afforded certain interests and responsibilities, including
an interest in visitation and the responsibility to pay child support.37 Those
interests and duties exist at birth and are not dependent on the establishment of
a parental right. Additionally, in some jurisdictions, the child can inherit from
his parent irrespective of whether a constitutionally protected parental right is
ever established.38 In short, the aforementioned rights and responsibilities attach
at birth and have their basis in biology rather than relationship.
When parental rights have been terminated, the biological connection
remains intact, and a legally recognizable parent-child relationship continues to
exist.39 Even state statutes that declare the parent and child legal strangers to
one another after an order terminating parental rights has been issued recognize
some residual connection. For example, Alaska statute 25.23.130 states that “a
decree terminating parental rights . . . voids all legal relationships between the
child and the biological parent so that the child is a stranger to the biological
parent and to relatives of the biological parent for all purposes.”40 That same
statute provides that inheritance rights between a child and a biological parent
are not voided by the termination order.41 Furthermore, Washington law states
that a termination order severs and terminates “all rights, powers, privileges,
immunities, duties, and obligations, including any rights to custody, control,
visitation, or support existing between the child and parent.” 42 Meanwhile, state
law permits the restoration of those rights under certain circumstances.43 In other
states, statutes and case law allow for post-termination visitation,44 continue the
36. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983).
37. See, e.g., Ex rel. Matchett v. Dunkle, 508 N.W.2d 580 (Neb. 1993) (holding that the duty
to pay child support begins at the time of the child’s birth).
38. Megan Pendleton, Intestate Inheritance Claims: Determining A Child’s Right to Inherit
When Biological and Presumptive Paternity Overlap, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2823, 2826 ("some
statutory schemes treat the fact of biology as dispositive in establishing paternity and allow a child
with a presumed father to inherit from a separate biological father's intestate estate, regardless of
whether the biological parent had a role in the child's upbringing.").
39. The fact that the child’s birth certificate is not amended after parental rights are terminated
further supports the argument that a relationship continues to exist. While a new birth certificate
is issued reflecting a change in the parent-child relationship after an adoption decree is entered, no
changes are made to birth certificates after a termination order. “Most fundamentally, the birth
certificate certifies and proves parenthood: the person or persons on the birth certificate are the
child’s legal parents.” Annette Appell, Certifying Identity, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 361, 396 (2014).
40. ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.130(d) (2015).
41. Id. at (e).
42. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.200(1) (2007).
43. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.215(1) (2007).
44. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.811(7)(b) (West 2013) (providing for post-termination contact, in
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responsibility to pay child support,45 and preserve intestate succession.46
Furthermore, the fact that parental rights have been terminated does not affect a
child’s eligibility for Social Security survivor’s benefits based on a biological
parent’s wage record.47
Courts have also allowed parents to retain rights to notice if their child is
not adopted. In In re Lara S.,48 for example, a mother voluntarily relinquished
her parental rights to her three sons. In her relinquishment, she stated that if the
current foster placement were to disrupt, she retained “the privilege to be
notified that the placement is no longer available.”49 Specifically, she requested
that notification be sent to her by regular and certified mail. Pursuant to state
statute, the trial court incorporated the provisions into its order terminating her
parental rights and, once the placement disrupted, the mother was provided with
notice.50
A bill introduced in Utah in 2014 further supports the argument that biology
alone creates an interest that is not severed when parental rights are terminated.
H.B. 418 changes the statutory definition of grandparent to include children
whose parental rights have been terminated.51 The law will allow grandparents
to petition the court for visitation rights, even over the objection of an adoptive
parent. “It would be unjust and unnecessary to say that a grandparent no longer
has standing to petition for visitation rights simply because parental rights were

some circumstances, by statute); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.2061 (West 2003).
45. See Campbell v. Davison, DR-03-20.01 (Ala. Ct. of Civ. App., 2008), available at
http://alabamaappellatewatch.com/uploads/file/2070465.PDF (providing overview of state case
law deciding whether a parent’s obligation to pay child support ends when parental rights are
terminated); Theresa M. Pelfrey, Is the Termination of Parental Rights the Termination of Parental
Responsibility?, 13 GLOBAL J. HUM. SOC. SCI. ARTS & HUMAN. 13, 14 (2013).
46. See Richard Lewis Brown, Underserving Heirs?—The Case of the “Terminated” Parent,
40 U. RICH. L. REV. 547 (2006); Richard L. Brown, Disinheriting the “Legal Orphan”: Inheritance
Rights of Children After Termination of Parental Rights, 70 MO. L. REV. 125 (2005) (noting that
in some states, termination of parental rights statutes expressly provide that the right of the child to
inherit from the biological parent survives termination). See also, HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-63 (“No
judgment of termination of parental rights . . . shall operate to terminate the mutual rights of
inheritance of the child and the parent or parents involved, or to terminate the legal duties and
liabilities of the parent or parents, unless and until the child has been legally adopted.”).
47. See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM
(POMS), PR 01215.028 Missouri (June 14, 2006), available at https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/
poms.nsf/lnx/1501215028.
48. In re Lara S., 209 P.3d 120 (Alaska 2009).
49. Id. at 122.
50. ALASKA STAT. § 25.25.180 (2015) (“In a relinquishment of parental rights . . . a parent
may retain privileges with respect to the child, including the ability to have future contact,
communication, and visitation with the child. A retained privilege must be stated in writing with
specificity. Not less than 10 days after the relinquishment is signed, the court may enter an order
terminating parental rights if the court finds that termination of parental rights under the terms of
the agreement is in the child's best interest. If a parent has retained one or more privileges, the
court shall incorporate the retained privileges into the termination order with a recommendation
that the retained privileges be incorporated in an adoption or legal guardianship decree.”).
51. H.B. 418, 60th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2014), available at http://le.utah.gov/~2014/bills
/static/HB0418.html.
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terminated.”52 Such bills and similar statutes, case law and policies recognize
that parents, and by extension grandparents, retain an interest in their biological
child and have some continued responsibility for their well-being.
At least two appellate courts have recognized the existence of a parent-child
relationship after parental rights have been terminated. In Wynn v. The Superior
Court of Fresno County, the Court of Appeals, Fifth District of California held
that “a superior court has the authority to adjudicate the existence of a biological
mother-child relationship even when the child has been adopted.”53 In that case,
the appellant filed a petition in a superior court seeking an order correcting her
original birth certificate, which had been sealed when she was adopted. The
court concluded that “the law recognizes some relationships between a child and
his or her biological parents even after an adoption has occurred.”54 The court
noted the existence of general legal duties and obligations that are established
based on blood relationships.55 In In re Adoption/Guardianship Nos. 11387 and
11388, the Court of Appeals of Maryland acknowledged “that a natural parent
whose parental rights have been terminated has some level of interest in the
status of her biological children.” The court further explained that the interest
“is greater than a third party unrelated to the children or uninvolved in the
matter.”56 Thus, it is clear that the opportunity interest retained by the biological
parent is superior to any interest that a third party, such as a foster parent, may
assert.
In fact, when the issue of whether a child’s placement with a foster parent
created a liberty interest in that relationship came before the Supreme Court, the
Court failed to resolve the question. In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families
for Equality and Reform (OFFER), foster parents asserted a liberty interest
protected by the 14th Amendment.57 They contended that “when a child has
lived in a foster home for a year or more, a psychological tie is created between
the child and the foster parents which constitutes the foster family the true
‘psychological family’ of the child.” That family, they argued, has a “liberty
interest” in its survival as a family protected by the 14th Amendment. This
argument has since been rejected by some U.S. circuit courts.58
While the opportunity interest is greater than any asserted third party
interest, Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that it is subordinate to a right.
In Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Supreme Court refused to recognize a biological
father’s opportunity interest when in direct conflict with the parental right
52. Amy McDonald, Bill: Grandparents Retain Rights after Parental Termination, THE SALT
TRIBUNE (Mar. 5, 2014, 2:57 PM), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/5763697590/adoptive-bill-court-family.html.csp.
53. Wynn v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. App. 4th 356, 355 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
54. Id. at 354.
55. Id.
56. In re Adoption/Guardianship Nos. 11387 and 11388, 731 A.2d 972, 984 (Md. 1999).
57. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 839 (1977).
58. See, e.g., Procopio v. Johnson, 994 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1993); Kyees v. Cty. Dep’t of Pub.
Welfare, 600 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1979); Drummond v. Fulton Cty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s
Servs., 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977).
LAKE
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possessed by the legal father.59 In that case, the Court confronted a claim of
parental rights by a biological father, whose child was born to the wife of another
man. While the plurality found that the biological father had no liberty interest
and rejected his constitutional challenge to the statutory presumption of
legitimacy, four members of the Court agreed that he had an interest in his
relationship with his daughter.60 Had the plurality recognized that interest, it
would have been subordinate to the legal father’s fundamental right.
The Constitution does not compel a state to respect a terminated parent’s
opportunity interest when the child has an adoptive parent or a legal custodian.
Nor is the terminated parent entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard in
proceedings to establish parental or custodial rights.61 When a child is adopted,
he or she becomes the legal child of the adoptive parent. “The effect of the
adoption decree is to transfer to the adoptive parent all legal rights, duties, and
consequences of the parental relationship; accordingly, the adoption decree
transfers the right to custody of the child, the right to control the child’s
education, the duty of obedience owing by the child, and all other legal
consequences and incidents of the natural relation in the same manner as if the
child had been born of such adoptive parents in lawful wedlock.”62 A custody
order grants “[t]he legal right to make major decisions affecting the best interest
of a minor child, including, but not limited to, medical, religious and educational
decisions.”63 When an adoption decree or custody order is in place, the parent’s
opportunity interest lies dormant and cannot be “re-grasped.”
Similarly, the interest becomes dormant when the child is placed in a preadoptive home.64 While courts have failed to find a liberty interest when a child
is in a foster home, some courts have recognized an interest when parental rights
have been terminated and there is an intention to adopt or create a permanent
legal relationship. For example, in Rodriguez v. McLoughlin, the Plaintiff
asserted that she had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the integrity
and stability of her pre-adoptive foster care relationship. Finding that an interest
did exist, the court’s decision relied on the fact that the Plaintiff had entered into
an Adoptive Placement Agreement, inter alia. “Thus, unlike the foster parents
in decisions subsequent to OFFER that have found that foster parents do not
have a liberty interest in their relationships with their foster children, as a
prospective adoptive parent who had entered into an Adoptive Placement
Agreement, [Plaintiff] cannot be said to have expected her relationship with [the
child] to end.”65
59. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 US 110, 118–31 (1989).
60. Id. at 136 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61. But see In re Adoption/Guardianship Nos. 11387 and 11388, 731 A.2d 972, 984 (Md.
1999).
62. 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption § 170 (2009).
63. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5302 (2009) (repealed 2011).
64. This argument is supported by and consistent with current reinstatement statutes that
require the court to find that the minor is not currently in placement likely to achieve permanency.
See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405 / 2-28 (2010); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405 / 2-34 (2010).
65. Rodriguez v. McLoughlin, 49 F. Supp. 2d 186, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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When no actual interest exists, however, and there is no likelihood that one
will be created66 or if the adoption or custody arrangement is terminated, the
state must provide a process by which the opportunity interest can be “regrasped.” “The delay in adoption acts in some sense to permit a ‘renewed’ legal
interest of natural parents in their children with respect to whom their parental
rights have been terminated.”67 Since 2005, 17 states have enacted reinstatement
of parental rights statutes which, with some modifications, could satisfy this
constitutional mandate.
B. “Re-Grasping” the Opportunity Interest Through Reinstatement of
Parental Rights
1. Reinstatement Statutes
In 2005, the move towards allowing terminated parents the opportunity to
restore their parental rights began in California.68 The law was enacted in
response to a case in which the First District Court of Appeals implored the
California Legislature to consider allowing the juvenile courts limited discretion
to reinstate parental rights where the child would otherwise be left a legal
orphan.69 “To avoid such an unhappy consequence, legislation may be advisable
authorizing judicial intervention under very limited circumstances following the
termination of parental rights and prior to the completion of adoption.”70 Two
years later, Nevada passed a statute that allows a Nevada court to restore parental
rights if a child is not likely to be adopted and if such reinstatement is in the
child’s best interest.71 Washington enacted a similar law, RCW 13.34.215,
permitting a child who has not achieved permanency within three years after the
termination of parental rights to petition to have his or her parents’ rights
reinstated.72
Following the trend, the Louisiana Children’s Code was amended in 2008
to permit parental rights to be reinstated upon motion by the department or a
child who is over the age of fifteen.73 That following year, Oklahoma74 and
Illinois75 modified their state statutes to provide a mechanism by which parental
rights could be restored. New York enacted its law in 2010,76 followed by

66. A change in permanency goal from adoption to APPLA means that a right to the child
will not be divested in any other person. See Section V(B).
67. In re Adoption/Guardianship Nos. 11387 and 11388, 731 A.2d 972, 983 (Md. 1999).
68. A.B. 519, 2005 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005) (as passed Oct. 7, 2005); CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 366.26(i)(3) (2015) (providing a method for reinstating parental rights over a child who
has not been adopted).
69. In re Jerred H., 121 Cal. App. 4th 793, 799 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
70. Susan Getman & Steve Christian, Reinstating Parental Rights: Another Path to
Permanency, 26 AM. HUMANE ASS’N 1, 64 (2011) (citing id. at 799).
71. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §128.190(3)(a)–(b) (LexisNexis 2013).
72. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.215(1) (2011).
73. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1051 (Supp. 2012).
74. OK. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-4-909 (2014).
75. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 405 / 2-34 (2013).
76. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 635–37 (McKinney Supp. 2012).
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Hawaii,77 Alaska,78 Maine,79 North Carolina,80 Virginia,81 Delaware,82 and
Utah.83 More recently, Minnesota enacted the Family Reunification Act of
2013, Georgia passed its 2013 Juvenile Justice Reform Legislation84 and, in
2014, the governor of Colorado signed into law an act allowing for reinstatement
of the parent-child relationship.85 In 2015, acts concerning restoration of parental
rights were introduced in the Connecticut and Iowa legislatures.86
Notwithstanding the trend towards post-termination reunification, some
state legislatures have not yet passed laws despite having bills introduced.87
Although reinstatement statutes were enacted to address issues related to legal
orphans, these statutes implicitly recognize the continued relationship that
terminated parents have with their children. While they are focused exclusively
on the rights of the child,88 parents’ interests are also implicated when the parentchild legal relationship is restored. The restoration statutes as written do not
provide an adequate means by which terminated parents can “re-grasp” their
retained opportunity interest. With some modifications, however, these statutes
could provide the necessary process.
2. Recommendations for Improving Reinstatement Statutes
The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges (NCJFCJ), in
its April 2013 Technical Assistance Bulletin, “Forever Families: Achieving
Permanency for Legal Orphans,” stated that “state laws should authorize
reinstatement of parental rights in appropriate cases.”89 Despite NCJFCJ’s
support for these statutes, they are not perfect. In her article, Parsing
Parenthood, Cynthia Godsoe argues that “the reinstatement statutes . . . reflect
a somewhat desperate attempt by states to circumvent the harsh mandate of the
ASFA timelines without sacrificing federal funding.”90 She further argues that
although this policy trend at first appeared promising, implicit bias, both on a
77. HAW. REV. STAT § 571-63 (2006).
78. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.089 (2010).
79. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 4059 (2011).
80. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1114 (2013).
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283.2 (2013).
82. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1116 (2013).
83. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-1404 (LexisNexis 2013).
84. MINN. STAT. § 260C.329 (2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-323 (2014).
85. S.B. 62, 40th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2014) (as passed March 27, 2014).
86. H.B. 6562, Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2015); H.B. 333, 86th Gen. Ass., 1st Sess.
(Iowa 2015).
87. See e.g., S.B. 994, 97th Leg., 2014 Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2013) (not signed); S. 65, 187th
Gen. Ct., 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2011) (not signed).
88. See Getman & Christian, supra note 70, at 64 (noting that the impetus for the first
reinstatement statute was “the plight of youth in foster care who had been legally freed for adoption
but who were likely to emancipate without achieving legal permanency.”).
89. Hon. Sharon McCully, Forever Families: Improving Outcomes by Achieving
Permanency for Legal Orphans, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BULLETIN, Apr. 2013, at 1, 19, available at http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites
/default/files/LOTAB_3_25_13_newcover.pdf.
90. Cynthia Godsoe, Parsing Parenthood, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 113, 144 n.190
(2013).
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systemic level and through individual workers, prevents reinstatement laws from
being “crafted or implemented to address the widespread economic and social
factors underlying child maltreatment or to expand the notion of permanency
beyond adoption.”91 This bias is both evident in the criteria set forth in the
statutes for restoring parental rights and the lack of policies that support the laws.
While not all of the reinstatement statutes are identical, they contain
common features that undermine their intended purpose and serve as barriers to
terminated parents seeking to restore their parental rights. First, the majority of
the statutes exclude the parent by only allowing the child or the child placing
agency to petition the court to restore parental rights; furthermore, in many states
neither the child nor the parent is appointed independent counsel. Second, most
statutes require a certain amount of time to elapse between the termination of
parental rights and reinstatement. Alternatively or in concert, the statutes require
that the child must have reached a specific age before a petition for reinstatement
can be filed. Third, statutes may not apply to children who have experienced a
disruption in their permanency and are re-entering the foster care system.
Additionally, the statutes lack the necessary support to make them effective,
including a requirement for post-termination visitation and the establishment of
registries to ensure that biological parents can be located and notified.
a. Terminated Parents are Generally Excluded from the Process
and Not Provided Counsel
Early reinstatement statutes were initially opposed by the adoption
community. In California, for example, adoption proponents “argued that
families would be reluctant to adopt children from foster care knowing that a
former parent might seek to interfere with a pending adoption by means of the
reinstatement process.”92 As a result, very few state statutes permit the
biological parent to petition the court for the reinstatement of parental rights,
grant the parent party status or provide for the appointment of legal
representation for the parent.93 In most jurisdictions, terminated parents are,
therefore, systematically excluded from the process. “This exclusion not only
reflects a negative, even biased, view of the parents in these cases, but is also
impractical since the parents’ exclusion makes it more difficult for courts and
child welfare agencies to adequately assess the parents’ capabilities and the best
interests of the children.”94
Under the current structure, a terminated parents’ right to participate in the
hearing determining whether the parent-child relationship should be restored is
identical to that of unrelated caregivers and other third parties in other hearings

91. Id. at 144.
92. Getman & Christian, supra note 70, at 65.
93. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.089 (2010) (permitting a parent who voluntarily
relinquished parental rights to request a review hearing to reinstate those rights); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §128.100(2) (LexisNexis 2013) (granting the court discretion to appoint an attorney for
indigent parents in restoration proceedings); and N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 636(d) (McKinney Supp.
2012) (providing attorney for the parent in proceeding to restore parental rights).
94. Godsoe, supra note 90, at 153.
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affecting the child. The Adoption and Safe Families Act provides that notice
and the opportunity to be heard be provided to the foster parents of a child and
any pre-adoptive parent or relative providing care for the child prior to any
review or hearing held with respect to the child.95 This right, however, does not
convey party status.96 Similarly, in Georgia, for example, terminated parents
have a right to be heard but are not parties and the hearing can be conducted in
their absence.97 States must recognize that the interests are not equal98 and grant
party status to parents once a petition has been filed. Terminated parents must
be afforded more procedural protections than third parties and should be
appointed counsel to assist them in “re-grasping” that opportunity interest.
The Minnesota Family Reunification Act of 2013 specifically states that
“the parent does not have the right to appointed counsel as part of the
reunification proceeding.” In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the
Supreme Court found no violation of the right to due process where an indigent
parent was not appointed an attorney in a termination of parental rights
proceeding. Despite this ruling, at least 48 states, recognizing the fundamental
interest at stake, have created a statutory right to counsel.99 That statutory right
should extend to all proceedings affecting a parent’s parental rights, including
hearings on whether those rights should be reinstated.100
b. Waiting Periods Are Unnecessary and Lead to Foster Care
Drift
Many state statutes have a requisite number of years which must elapse
before a petition can be filed;101 others require the child to have attained a certain
age;102 still others require both conditions to be met.103 This required waiting
period is unnecessarily harmful to children. Petitions for reinstatement cannot
be filed if a child is living in a pre-adoptive home104 and the waiting periods bear

95. Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 104(3)(G), 111 Stat.
2115, 2119 (1997).
96. Id.
97. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-323 (2015).
98. But see Cassandra S. Haury, Note, The Changing American Family: A Reevaluation of
the Rights of Foster Parents When Biological Parental Rights Have Been Terminated, 35 GA. L.
REV. 313, 324 (2000).
99. VIVEK SANKARAN, A NATIONAL SURVEY ON A PARENT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND DEPENDENCY CASES (2010), http://youthrightsjustice
.org/Documents/SurveyParentRighttoCounsel.pdf.
100. See In re Adoption/Guardianship Nos. 11387 and 11388, 731 A.2d 972, 984 (Md. 1999)
(extending right to counsel to terminated parent participating in post-termination hearing).
101. Hawaii requires 1 year; New York requires 2 years; Illinois, Oklahoma and Washington
require 3 years to pass between the issuance of the order terminating parental rights and a petition
for reinstatement.
102. See COMMONWEALTH OF VA. COMMISSION ON YOUTH, RESTORATION OF PARENTAL
RIGHTS, REPORT DOCUMENT 12 at 7–8 (2013), available at http://vcoy.virginia.gov/pdf/
Restoration%20of%20Parental%20RightsFINAL0114.pdf (providing a state-by-state comparison
of restoration laws).
103. Id. at 22.
104. Id. at 14.
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no relationship to the median age of a foster child at adoption, 5.1 years old,105
or the median time between termination and adoption, 8.6 months.106
Furthermore, requiring a parent and child to wait years before a petition can be
filed can lead to “foster care drift.”107
In 1959, Maas and Engler published Children in Need of Parents, a
landmarks study on the plight of child who “drifted aimlessly in foster care
without a case plan for their permanent care.”108 The study found that “staying
in care beyond a year and a half greatly increases a child’s chances of growing
up in care.”109 Although research methods have improved in the intervening
decades, more recent studies have reached the same conclusion: as children get
older, their chances of being adopted, or their “adoptability,”110 diminish.111
Youth whose parents’ rights have been terminated are particular vulnerable
to foster care drift. A recent study found that the likelihood of adoption is
reduced by 80% for each year that the youth spends in foster care after parental
rights are terminated.112 When a child is not adopted by the family with whom
he lived at the time of the termination proceeding, it is likely that he will move
around from home to home.113 It is also likely that the youth will experience a
change in permanency goal – from adoption to a goal that does not require
parental rights to be terminated.114 As the Mass and Engler study provided the
foundation for the pre-termination timeframes codified in the federal
legislation,115 more recent studies should prompt states to eliminate the waiting
105. AFCARS REPORT #21, supra note 6, at 5. The mean age is 6.3 years old.
106. Id. The mean time elapsed from termination of parental rights to adoption is 12.3
months.
107. Foster care drift is the term used to describe the situation where foster children would
remain out of the home, in the custody of the state, moving from placement to placement without
any real plan to move them into a permanent situation.
108. NATIONAL SURVEY OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT WELL-BEING, NO. 19: RISK OF LONGTERM FOSTER CARE PLACEMENT AMONG CHILDREN INVOLVED WITH THE CHILD WELFARE
SYSTEM (2013), available at https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/nscaw_ltfc
_research_brief_19_revised_for_acf_9_12_13_edit_clean.pdf (citing Henry S. Maas & Richard E.
Engler Jr., Children in need of parents (COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS 1959)).
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., In re R.C., 169 Cal. App. 4th 486, 492 (2008) (stating that determining
adoptability, the focus is on whether a child’s age, physical condition and emotional state will create
difficulty in locating a family willing to adopt).
111. Cushing & Greenblatt, supra note 21, at 695. This phenomenon is known as “negative
duration dependence” and it means that children are progressively less likely to leave care as their
time in care increases.
112. Id. at 700.
113. Id. at 698 (finding that only 30% of children who were not adopted by family that they
lived with prior to termination remained in that home).
114. Id. at 700. In that study, permanency goal changes were experienced by 29% of the
children who had not been adopted. 8% had a goal change to independent living, 15% had a goal
change to long-term foster care, 1% had a goal change to subsidized guardianship, less than 1%
had a goal change to reunification and 2% had a goal change to “other” with indication that transfer
to a long-term care facility was planned.
115. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500
(1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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periods in their reinstatement statutes and/or allow for more discretion,
especially in cases where it is clear that adoption is no longer the goal.116
In CC v. Commissioner of Social Services of Schenectady County, a
biological mother filed motions to restore her parental rights three years after
they had been terminated.117 Without reaching the merits or considering the
children’s best interests, the family court dismissed the petitions on the ground
that the children were not “[14] years of age or older.” There, the lower court
failed to exercise any discretion and the appellate court affirmed the strict
interpretation of the restoration statute. Such flexibility is important in cases
where it is clear that the child will not achieve permanency within the waiting
period. In In re Ronald V., for example, the birth mother’s rights were
terminated in anticipation of an adoption by the mother’s former boyfriend.118
A year after the termination order was entered and before the adoption was
completed, the former boyfriend died. Similarly, in In re Jerred H., parental
rights were terminated so that the child could be adopted by his stepfather.119
Within eight months of the termination order, the child had been removed from
his pre-adoptive home. In such cases, statutes must permit parents to begin
efforts to restore their parental rights prior to the expiration of an arbitrary time
period and before a child reaches a specified age.
A bill before the Utah legislature would eliminate the age requirement for
reinstating parental rights. Currently, rights can only be restored for children
who are 12 years of age or older. The new law, once passed, would permit an
authorized representative acting on behalf of a child of any age to file a petition
to restore parental rights if certain conditions are met. While the new law would
retain the waiting period of 24 months since the termination order, eliminating
the age requirement allows for more discretion and diminishes foster care drift.
c. Reinstatement Statutes Do Not Apply to All Terminated
Parents
Studies show that between 1% and 5% of finalized adoptions dissolve120
and legal guardianships established following an adjudication of child abuse or
neglect have a permanency disruption rate of 29%.121 As a result, some youth
who exit foster care to “permanency” will return to state care. Despite this fact,
only two reinstatement statutes explicitly addresses this phenomenon. An
Illinois law specifically states that minors returning to state care after the
dissolution of a private guardianship or adoption are eligible to have their
116. Some states allow the waiting period to be waived if the child placing agency stipulates
that the adoption is no longer the permanent plan for the youth. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 366.26(i)(3) (2015).
117. In re Shelia CC. v. Comm’r of Soc. Servs. of Schenectady Cnty. 98 A.D.3d 1200 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2012).
118. In re Ronald V., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 334, 335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
119. In re Jerred H., 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 481, 483 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
120. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, ADOPTION DISRUPTION AND DISSOLUTION 6 (2012), available
at https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/s_disrup.pdf.
121. James Henry, Permanency Outcomes in Legal Guardianships of Abused/Neglected
Children, 80 FAMILIES SOC’Y 561 (1999).
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parents’ rights reinstated.122 Similarly, a Utah statute permits parental rights to
be reinstated when a child who was previously adopted following a termination
of a parent-child legal relationship returns to foster care after a dissolved
adoption.123
While it is unclear how other states will interpret their statute as it relates
to youth returning to care after a disruption in their permanency, at least one case
suggests that the laws will be deemed not to apply. In In re the Interest of J.R.,
the Washington court held that the reinstatement statute did not apply to cases
where a child returned to foster care after achieving permanency through legal
guardianship.124 In that case, the guardianship was terminated upon the request
of the guardians ten years after it was ordered. The child, then 15 years old,
petitioned for reinstatement of his mother’s parental rights under RCW
13.34.215. At the threshold hearing, the State argued that the child did not meet
the statutory criteria for filing a reinstatement petition. The State argued that the
child had, in fact, achieved permanency within three years of the termination
order.125 The court recognized that reinstatement might be in the child’s best
interest but denied the petition.126
Once these youth return to care, they should be permitted to avail
themselves of the same legal options available to those youth who remained in
foster care following the termination of their parents’ rights. The current
interpretation creates a class of biological parents who, although similarly
situated to those whose children never achieved permanency, are unable to
benefit from reinstatement statutes. As such, these terminated parents have no
legal mechanism to “re-grasp” their opportunity interest, which revived when
the adoption or guardianship was terminated.127
In addition to the issues with the statutes themselves, implementation of the
laws has been hampered by policies and laws that do not support a terminated
parent’s efforts to “re-grasp” her retained opportunity interest. Specifically,
reinstatement statutes would be more effective if post-termination visitation was
required and if states established birth parent registries.

122. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 405/2-34(b)(i)–(iii) (1987).
123. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-1403(1) (LexisNexis 2013).
124. In re J.R., 230 P.3d 1087, 1093 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that that its reinstatement
law does apply to a youth whose adoption dissolves); In re T.H., 438 P.3d 1089 (Okla. 2015)
(summarizing the child filed an application to reinstate her biological mother’s parental rights
twelve years after being adopted. The child’s adoptive parents had relinquished their parental rights
and the child wished to restore the legal relationship with her mother. The Court found that the
phrase “has not achieved his or her permanency plan” includes “situations where permanency
through adoption or other proceedings has failed.”).
125. In re J.R., 230 P.3d at 1091 (arguing that “permanent” does not mean “forever” but
simply means “intended to last”).
126. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.215 (2015). The Washington Legislature subsequently
amended its statute to include children whose permanent guardianship had failed.
127. See Section IV(A).
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d. Post-Termination Visitation is Necessary
The traditional notion that parents become legal strangers to their children
once parental rights have been terminated justifies prohibiting post-termination
contact.128 The severance of legal and social ties between the terminated parent
and the child is believed to support a child’s need for stability, predictability and
permanence.129 Studies have shown, however, that maintaining emotional
connections with birth family is important to many foster youth, especially those
who age out of care.130 “Post-termination contact allows children to retain their
social relationships with terminated birth parents when birth parents are unable
to care for their children but still play a positive role in their children’s lives.”131
Further, for parents and children wishing to reunify post-termination, parentchild contact is especially important. Such contacts should include indirect
communication as well as direct contact and visitation.132
Although some courts have ordered post-termination visitation when in the
child’s best interests,133 in most cases, courts have denied requests for continued
contact after parental rights have been terminated134 or the post-termination
128. See, e.g., C.R.H. v. C.H., 620 N.W.2d 175, 178–79 (S.D. 2000) (holding that governing
statutes do not vest any discretionary authority upon a court entering a decree of parental
termination to provide visitation rights or other privileges to terminated parent); In re Jacob E., 18
Cal. Rptr. 3d 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (voiding trial court order granting birth mother posttermination visitation).
129. In an effort to achieve permanency for foster care youth, ASFA establishes strict
timelines to initiate proceedings to terminate parental rights. 42 U.S.C. § 675(4)(E) (2000).
130. See Mark E. Courtney, The Difficult Transition to Adulthood for Foster Youth in the Us:
Implications for the State as Corporate Parent, 23 SOC. POL’Y REP. 3, 4 (2009) (finding that almost
all of “aged out” foster youth in their sample maintained at least some family ties). Ninety-four
percent of those studied reported feeling somewhat or very close to at least one biological family
member. Id. Eighty-three percent reported having contact with one or more biological family
members at least once a week. Id.; See also Mary E. Collins, Ruth Paris & Rolanda L. Ward, The
Permanence of Family Ties: Implications for Youth Transitioning From Foster Care, 78 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 54 (2008) (providing an overview of recent study findings of former foster
youth living with family after care); Katharine Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive
Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70
VA. L. REV. 879, 905 (1984).
131. Alexis T. Williams, Note, Rethinking Social Severance: Post-Termination Contact
Between Birth Parents and Children, 41 CONN. L. REV. 609, 609 (2008).
132. See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, FAMILY REUNIFICATION: WHAT EVIDENCE SHOWS (2011)
available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/issue_briefs/family_reunification/ (supporting the
significance of parent-child visitation as a predictor of family reunification).
133. See, e.g., In re Elise K., 654 P.2d 253 (Cal. 1982) (recognizing that it would have been
detrimental to the child to completely sever her ties with her mother and ordered bimonthly visits
pending a final decree of adoption) and In re Kahlil S., 35 A.D.3d 1164, 1165 (2006) (holding that
the Family Court has discretion to order post-termination contact with a mentally ill or mentally
retarded biological parent).
134. In most states, once parental rights are terminated, the parent is no longer a party to the
proceeding and has no right to appear or move the court for visitation. See, e.g., Amber R. v.
Superior Court of Orange County, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297, 298–99 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that
birth mother lacked standing to seek visitation after her rights were terminated). In other cases, the
parent does not present sufficient evidence to support the granting of post-termination visitation.
See, e.g., In re Alyssa W., 619 S.E.2d 220, 224–25 (W. Va. 2005) (denying post-termination
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visitation order has been vacated on appeal.135 This is true even in states with
reinstatement statutes, such as New York. Two years after New York enacted
its reinstatement statute, the Court of Appeals of New York affirmed a lower
court’s finding that “the request for post-termination visitation was properly
denied as unavailable in a contested termination proceeding.”136 The New York
Court of Appeals found no statutory support for post-termination contact outside
the context of a voluntary relinquishment of parental rights.137 The prohibition
against post-termination visitation harms foster care youth, undermines
reinstatement statutes and affects a terminated parent’s ability to “re-grasp” her
retained opportunity interest.
The Virginia reinstatement statute, for example, requires that the court,
during the hearing on the motion, find, based upon clear and convincing
evidence, that the parent is willing and able to have a positive, continuous
relationship with the child. In such proceedings, the court determines whether
the parent has formed or has the ability to form the requisite relationship with
the child.138 Such a finding would be purely speculative unless post-termination
visitation is permitted or mandated prior to the filing of the petition.
Without clear direction from the state legislature or the court, the decision
whether to allow contact is left within the discretion of the child placing agency.
“[A]necdotal evidence suggests that many case workers and others working with
families in the child welfare system are firmly entrenched in the belief that ‘once
a bad parent, always a bad parent.”139 “The attitudes of . . . child welfare workers
toward birth parents can affect the engagement and involvement of parents;
when engagement affects birth parent-child visitation, outcomes for children are
affected as well.”140 If their discretion is exercised improperly, foster youth may
be foreclosed from reuniting with their terminated parent, even when the parent,
if given the chance, could re-establish her parental right.
visitation where there was no close emotional bond and where visits would have interfered with
child’s permanent placement); A.W. v. Dep’t of Child. & Families, 969 So. 2d 496, 505 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2007) (upholding trial court order prohibiting mother from having post-termination
visitation or contact with child where no parent-child relationship existed).
135. See, e.g., C.R.H. v. C.H., 620 N.W.2d 175, 178–79 (2000) (holding that governing
statutes do not vest any discretionary authority upon a court entering a decree of parental
termination to provide visitation rights or other privileges to terminated parent); In re Jacob E., 18
Cal. Rptr. 3d 15 (2004) (voiding trial court order granting birth mother post-termination visitation).
136. In re Hailey ZZ, 19 N.Y.3d 422, 429 (2012).
137. Id. (noting in a dissent that “As to the question whether a hearing court has the authority
to order contact between a parent and his or her child, after parental rights have been terminated . .
. , I believe the hearing court has the authority to do so– not because the parent retains rights over
the child, but in the exercise of proper discretion by the court.”).
138. See Lara S. v. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 209 P.3d 120 (Alaska 2009) (denying a
terminated mother’s motion because her affidavit failed to establish: (1) that it was in the children’s
best interests that her parental rights be reinstated, (2) that she had successfully addressed her
substance abuse problem, and (3) that she was capable of caring for her children).
139. Godsoe, supra note 90, at 39.
140. Tyler Corwin, Strategies to Increase Birth Parent Engagement, Partnership, and
Leadership in the Child Welfare System: A Review, CASEY FOUND. (July 2012), http://www.casey.
org/media/BirthParentEngagement.pdf.
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Furthermore, some states have erected barriers that prevent terminated
from forming such a relationship, either through statute or case law. In In the
Interest of Hughes, the birth mother argued that a Texas statute that prohibited
“a former parent whose parent-child relationship with the child has been
terminated by court decree” from filing a petition to adoption violated equal
protection under both the state and federal constitutions.141 Since biological
parents whose parental rights have been terminated are not a suspect class, the
court applied the “rational basis test” to determine the legality of the statute.142
The court found that legitimate state interests relating to the child and the public
policy favoring the finality of judgments are both served by the statute.143 Some
courts have held that a parent whose rights have been terminated may not
relitigate that issue through a petition for adoption, or through any other legal
proceeding.144 In these jurisdictions, amending the ASFA to include posttermination reunification would create the necessary structure to allow
terminated parents to “re-grasp” their opportunity interest.145
e. Birth Parent Registries Must Be Established
Once the permanency goal changes from reunification, the child placing
agency is no longer required to work with the parent. While visitation may
continue, as discussed above, it is usually discontinued after parental rights are
terminated. Several states have established adoption reunion registries, which
assist adoptees and birth parents who want to reconnect.146 Few states maintain
registries that can be utilized by child placing agencies to assist legal orphans
and biological parents in locating and reconnecting with one another.147
141. Ex rel. Hughes, 770 S.W.2d 635, 636–37 (1989).
142. Id. at 637. See also Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966) (“Equal protection
does not require that all persons be dealt with identically, but it does require that a distinction made
have some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made.”). In today's constitutional
jurisprudence, equal protection means that legislation that discriminates must have a rational basis
for doing so. If the legislation affects a fundamental right (such as the right to vote) or involves a
suspect classification (such as race), it is unconstitutional unless it can withstand strict scrutiny.
Under strict scrutiny, the state must establish that it has a compelling interest that justifies and
necessitates the law in question.
143. Hughes, 770 S.W.2d at 637.
144. In re G.C.B., 870 P.2d 1037 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that married couple Megan
and Wade Lucas sought to adopt Mrs. Lucas’ biological child nearly a year after she voluntarily
relinquished her parental rights. The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1, rejected the
Lucas’ argument that Mrs. Lucas possessed the same rights as any other person to petition to adopt
the child and held that “a parent whose rights have been terminated may not relitigate that issue
through a petition for adoption, or through any other legal proceeding.”); In the Interest of
R.N.R.R., 2007 WL 2505629 (2007) (affirming the trial court’s dismissal of a biological father’s
adoption petition).
145. See Section IV.
146. See DCF Press Office, Florida Department of Children and Families, Recognizing that
Adoption is a Lifelong Journey, Florida’s Adoption Reunion Registry Helps Adoptees, Birth
Parents Reunite, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES (Nov. 12, 2014),
http://www.myflfamilies.com/press-release/recognizing-adoption-lifelong-journey-florida%E2
%80%99s-adoption-reunion-registry-helps.
147. Despite not having formal mechanisms for locating biological parents, reinstatement
statutes require that terminated parents receive notice and allow for the dismissal of the petition if
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The federal government has acknowledged the need to engage in intensive
family finding efforts that would benefit legal orphans and other youth in foster
care. In 2008, Congress enacted the Fostering Connections to Success and
Increasing Act. The Act authorized grants to State, local, or Tribal child welfare
agencies and private nonprofit organizations for the purpose of helping children
who are in foster care reconnect with family members through kinship navigator
programs and efforts to find biological parents and re-establish relationships.148
The Act also expanded the Office of Child Support Enforcement’s authority to
share information with State child welfare agencies for child welfare
purposes.149 Although the purpose of this expansion is to facilitate “more
informed and timely decisions about permanency,” these “locate only” requests
can only be made for “an individual who has or may have parental rights.”150
While terminated parents retain an opportunity interest, as discussed above, it is
not a right. Thus, terminated parents are not included in search requests and
child placing agencies cannot take advantage of the parent locator databases to
find them.
The District of Columbia passed the Adoption Reform Amendment Act of
2009, which establishes a Voluntary Foster Care Registry.151 Current and
former foster care youth (who are at least 18 years of age) and their immediate
birth family members are eligible for enrollment. “Even if people were in the
system a long time ago or only for a short time, this may be a way to get back in
touch with family.”152 The Voluntary Foster Care Registry does not search for
relatives; however, similar registries could be used to assist states in locating
terminated parents if the child is not adopted.153 Once located, these parents
could begin the process of re-establishing their relationship and converting their
retained opportunity interest into a parental right.
In 2015, a bill was introduced in the Utah legislature to amend provisions
of its Restoration of Parental Rights Act.154 That bill proposes a process by
which a terminated parent who has remedied the circumstances that resulted in
the parent cannot be located. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-4-909(F) (2014), LA. CHILD.
CODE ANN. art. 1051(D) (Supp. 2012).
148. Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-351, 122 Stat. 3949, 3959 (2008). Fostering Connections establishes a new competitive grant
program, under Title IV-B, Subpart 1 of the Social Security Act named Family Connection Grants.
Under this program, public child welfare agencies (state, local or tribal), and non-profit private
organizations may seek federal funding to help children connect or reconnect with birth parents or
other extended kin.
149. Id.
150. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, REQUESTS FOR LOCATE SERVICES, REFERRALS, AND
ELECTRONIC INTERFACE BETWEEN CHILD WELFARE AND CHILD SUPPORT INFORMATION
SYSTEMS (2012), available at http://www.nrcpfc.org/downloads/wu/ACYF-CB-IM-12-06.pdf.
151. D.C. CODE § 4-1303.08 (2010).
152. New Database Helps Reconnect Families Separated by Child Welfare, CHILD AND
FAMILY SERVICES AGENCY (May 13, 2013), http://cfsa.dc.gov/release/new-database-helpsreconnect-families-separated-child-welfare.
153. In addition, child welfare agencies should develop policies encouraging the use of social
media to locate and contact birth parents.
154. H.B. 334, 2015 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2015).
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the termination to notify the child-placing agency of her desire to have parental
rights reinstated. At which time that reinstatement becomes a viable option, the
“former parent’s request . . . shall be fully and fairly considered . . . for
appropriate submittal to the court.”155 While not establishing a formal registry,
the proposed changes to the current law allows parents to register their interest
in post-termination reunification.
f. Judicial Training is Necessary
In addition to the amendments discussed below, judicial training is
necessary to prevent the possibility that reinstatement statutes might serve to
increase, rather than decrease, the number of terminations granted each year. In
In re Deandre D., the Appellate Court of Illinois failed to reach the issue of
whether a court could give consideration to the possibility that parental rights
might be reinstated in the future when determining whether termination of
parental rights was in a child’s best interest.156 Without definite guidance, there
is the possibility that judges, when faced with difficult decisions, will view the
reinstatement statutes as a “safety net” and err on the side of terminating parental
rights.
Some states require the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that
the child is adoptable prior to terminating parental rights.157 Generally, making
such a finding makes it less likely that a child will remain a legal orphan for a
time period longer than necessary to secure a stable and permanent home. As
such, in states like California, youth should have protection on both sides of the
termination process. However, the presence of the reinstatement statute has
been noted in recent cases where the adoptability finding was challenged. “The
concern about ‘legal orphaning’ of children . . . is outmoded, however, in that
the statute was amended in 2005 . . . . Thus, under the current statute, there is
no danger of any child becoming a legal orphan.”158 This is interpretation of the
statute and weakening the requirement fails to take into consideration the fact
that the statutes are rarely used. Further, it does not take into account the
problems with the current reinstatement statutes.
155. Id.
156. In re Deandre D., 940 N.E.2d 246 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2010).
157. A child’s adoptability relates to whether his or her age, physical condition, and
emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt him or her. See, e.g. In re: R.C.,
86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 776, 780–81 (stating that determining adoptability, the focus is on whether a child’s
age, physical condition and emotional state will create difficulty in locating a family willing to
adopt.)
158. In re S.O., 2010 WL 570491 (Cal. Ct. App., Feb. 18, 2010) (No. E048744). Even
without reinstatement statutes, some judges have little concern with the possibility that children
whose parental rights are terminated will become legal orphans. In a 2009 study of 20 judges
representing 18 different states, 55% of judges reported not being concerned. Of those judges,
some “reported being less concerned because the main reasons why children whose parental rights
have been terminated are not subsequently adopted are out their control.” RAQUEL ELLIS ET AL.,
THE TIMING OF TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS: A BALANCING ACT FOR CHILDREN’S BEST
INTERESTS, CHILD TRENDS RESEARCH BRIEF (2009), available at http://childtrends.org/wpcontent/uploads
/2009/09/Child_Trends-2009_09_09_RB_LegalOrphans.pdf.
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g. All States Must Enact Reinstatement Statutes
Although reinstating parental rights may be concerning to some, “states are
beginning to consider that the illusive concept of legal risk or fear . . . should not
be allowed to justify overlooking this important avenue in preventing legal
orphanage.”159 Despite this, several states have failed to enact reinstatement
statutes despite having bills introduced.160 Still others have not made efforts to
enact laws that would permit terminated parents to be considered as a placement
resource for their biological children.
Some states, such as Ohio, New Jersey and Florida have recognized a need
to address the legal problem but have not passed legislation permitting parental
rights to be restored. In 2011 these states were selected to participate in a legal
orphans project sponsored by the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges (NCJFCJ). The project will have “a strong focus on achieving
permanency for legal orphans through vigilant judicial oversight, adoption,
guardianship, kinship placement, and building strong skills for transition to
adulthood.”161 Each participant state must identify the number of children who
are 12 and older with termination of parental rights regardless of whether their
plan is adoption and who have been in foster care for at least one year, produce
a written report about the problem, propose solutions, and start a national
dialogue among child welfare professionals and the judiciary, and build a
national curriculum around permanency counseling for children who identify as
not interested in being adopted.162 These states, and others that are similarly
situated, must recognize that terminated parents are constitutionally entitled to
an established process to “re-grasp” their opportunity interest.
As that entitlement is based on the Constitution, the federal government
should ensure that all states are have a legal mechanism in place. Although
issues related to family law and child welfare are traditionally left to the states,
Congress has enacted laws regulating family relationships related to children.
“Congress has enacted an extensive legislative program in family law since
1974, based on its spending and commerce powers under Article I, its power
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause in Article IV, and its enforcement power
159. Debbie F. Freitas, et al., From Foster Drift to Legal Orphans: The Need for Statutes
That Reinstate Terminated Parental Rights, 28 AM. J. FAM. L. 88 (2014).
160. In 2010, S.B. 1587 was introduced in Michigan. S.B. 1587, 95th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2010).
The reinstatement bill did not pass. A similar bill, S.B. 994, was introduced in 2014. S.B. 994,
97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2014). In 2011, an act relative to the reinstatement of parental rights was
introduced in the Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
The bill was referred to Senate Ways and Means Committee, where no action was taken. S.B. 65,
187th Gen. Ct., 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2011) (not signed).
161. Sharon McCully, Legal Orphans Permanent Families: Improving Outcomes by
Achieving Permanency for Legal Orphans, NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES (Dec. 13,
2012), http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/LEGAL%20ORPHANS%20Webinar%20
PP_Final.pdf.
162. Sharon McCully and Elizabeth Whitney Barnes, Forever Families: Improving
Outcomes by Achieving Permanency for Legal Orphans, NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT.
JUDGES 19 (April 4, 2013), http://www.ncjfcj.org/resource-library/publications/forever-familiesimproving-outcomes-achieving-permanency-legal-orphans.
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under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”163 Such laws include the Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of
1980 and the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997.
The federal Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) should be amended
to include post-termination reunification as a permanency goal. A new goal will
provide a federally-mandated process by which terminated parents can actively
pursue reunification. This amendment would be consistent with the trend
towards post-termination reunification and respect the interests of terminated
parents. While federal law cannot control state child welfare programs, funding
incentive and penalties contained within the ASFA would encourage compliance
and help ensure that terminated parents are provided an ability to “re-grasp” their
retained opportunity interest.
V.

A.

THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT AND POST-TERMINATION
REUNIFICATION
Overview of the ASFA and Permanency Goals

The Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) was signed into law by
President Bill Clinton on November 19, 1997.164 The ASFA establishes three
national goals for children in foster care: safety, permanency, and well-being.165
Five principles underlie the ASFA and apply to professionals working with
families through public and private agencies as well as state courts. These
principles are: (1) Safety is the paramount concern that must guide all child
welfare services; (2) Foster care is temporary; (3) Permanency planning efforts
should begin as soon as the child enters care; (4) The child welfare system must
focus on results and accountability; and (5) Innovative approaches are needed to
achieve the goals of safety, permanency, and well-being.166
The ASFA’s primary goal is to expedite permanency for children in out-ofhome care by setting specific timeframes in which the state must act on a child’s
permanency plan. It established five permissible permanency goals: return to
parent, adoption, legal guardianship, permanent placement with a fit and willing
relative, and “another planned permanent living arrangement” (APPLA).167 The

163. Ann Laquer Estin, Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and the States, 18
Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 267 (2009).
164. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997).
165. KASIA O. MURRAY & SARAH GESIRIECH, A BRIEF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM (2004), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploaded
files/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/foster_care_reform/LegislativeHistory2004pdf (last visited Oct.
11, 2015).
166. Mickey J. W. Smith, ASFA and Substance Abuse: Understanding the Issues Impacting
Two Systems of Care, NAT’L ASS’N OF SOC. WORKERS (Oct. 2003), available at
http://www.naswdc.org/practice/children/cws1003.pdf.
167. AFCARS REPORT #21, supra note 6, at 1. On September 30, 2012, there were an
estimated 397,122 children in foster care in the United States. More than half (53%) had a
permanency goal of reunification with parents or principal caretaker; 24% had a goal of adoption;
5% had a goal of long-term foster care; 5% had a goal of emancipation; 4% had a goal of
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ASFA requires that a permanency hearing be held once a child has been in care
for 12 months and at 12-month intervals thereafter. During these hearings, the
court decides the child’s permanency goal and inquires whether reasonable
efforts are being made to accomplish that goal. While permanency for children
is the overarching principle, how permanence is defined has a significant effect
on how the law is implemented.
A Call to Action: An Integrated Approach to Youth Permanency and
Preparation for Adulthood puts forward a comprehensive definition of
permanence: “having an enduring family relationship that is (1) safe and meant
to last a lifetime; (2) offers the legal rights and social status of full family
membership; (3) provides for physical, emotional, social, cognitive and spiritual
well-being; and (4) assures lifelong connections to extended family, siblings,
other significant adults, family history and traditions, race and ethnic heritage,
culture, religion, and language.”168 Permanency has also been described by
foster care youth as consisting of relational permanence, physical permanence,
and legal permanence.169 Relational (or psychological) permanence consists of
long-term, loving and accepting relationships and includes relationships with
parental figures such as biological parents; physical permanence consists of
stability in community; and legal permanence consists of a legal relationship
between the youth and a caretaker.170
“The primary goal of the child welfare system is to pursue legal
permanence. While this goal can create both relational permanence and
[physical] permanence, the pursuit of legal permanence at the expense of
relational and [physical] permanence may be contributing to a state of
impermanence among foster care youth.”171 “It is inconsistent to argue that a
child’s need for legal permanency justifies shortened timelines for permanency
hearings and TPR efforts, then downplay the importance of legal permanency
once parental rights are terminated.”172 Expanding the number and type of
permanency options available to legal orphans supports the ASFA’s goal of
achieving permanency for all foster care youth. The best interests of these youth
require the state to explore the possibility that a terminated parent may provide
the youth’s best chance for a permanent and stable home.

guardianship; and 5% had no established goal.
168. LAUREN FREY ET AL., CASEY FAMILY SERVS., A CALL TO ACTION: AN INTEGRATED
APPROACH TO YOUTH PERMANENCY AND PREPARATION FOR ADULTHOOD 4 (2005), available at
http://www.aecf.org/upload/PublicationFiles/casey_permanency_0505.pdf.
169. REINA M. SANCHEZ, CAL. PERMANENCY FOR YOUTH PROJECT, YOUTH PERSPECTIVE
ON PERMANENCY (2004), available at http://familyfinding.org/uploaded_files/fck/files/Youth
Perspectives.pdf.
170. Tonia Scott & Nora Gustavsson, Balancing Permanency and Stability for Youth in
Foster Care, 32 CHILD. & YOUTH SERV. REV. 619 (2010).
171. Id. at 619.
172. Brenda D. Smith, After Parental Rights are Terminated: Factors Associated with Exiting
Foster Care, 25 CHILD. & YOUTH SERV. REV. 965, 980 (2003).

ADAMS - (RE-)GRASPING THE OPPORTUNITY INTEREST

56

B.

(DO NOT DELETE)

KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y

12/18/2015 6:50 PM

[ Vol. XXV:1

Post-Termination Reunification Permanency Goal Under APPLA

One way to expand permanency options for legal orphans is to interpret
APPLA to include post-termination reunification. APPLA is formally defined
as “any permanent living arrangement not enumerated in the statute.” 173 “[It]
is meant to be a permanent placement for the child, not just a foster care
placement that can be indefinitely extended.”174 A child welfare agency may
choose, and a court may approve, APPLA when it has been documented to the
court that compelling reasons exist that make more a preferred permanency
option unacceptable.175 APPLA traditionally includes long-term family foster
care, placement in a group foster home, or placement in an institution such as a
hospital or mental health facility.176 As such, it has become the “euphemistic
replacement” for “long-term foster care”, which is no longer a legally
permissible permanency goal.177 As of September 20, 2013, 10% of youth in
foster care had an APPLA goal.178 Youth with APPLA goals are often at higher
risk of exiting the foster care system without the possibility of establishing legal
and permanent connections.179
While post-termination reunification could fall within a broad
interpretation of the definition of APPLA, amending the ASFA would recognize
the difference between the needs of children with a more traditional APPLA goal
who have very limited family connections and those who have a placement
resource. A distinct post-termination reunification goal would signal to the child
welfare agency and the judges that different levels and types of services are
necessary to facilitate post-termination reunification. Furthermore, since the
ASFA makes no distinctions between or prioritize among APPLA options, posttermination would not be given precedence over the more traditional APPLA
outcomes such long-term foster care or emancipation if a separate goal is not
created.

173. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (2012).
174. 45 C.F.R. §§ 1355–1357 (2015).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (2012).
176. See Emily W. McGill, Agency Knows Best? Restricting Judges’ Ability to Place
Children in Alternative Planned Permanent Living Arrangements, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 247
(2007).
177. See CECILIA FIERMONTE & JENNIFER L. RENNE, ABA CTR. ON CHILDREN & THE LAW,
MAKING IT PERMANENT: REASONABLE EFFORTS TO FINALIZE PERMANENCY PLANS FOR FOSTER
CHILDREN (2002), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative
/child_law/2002_Making_It_Permanent.authcheckdam.pdf.
178. AFCARS REPORT #21, supra note 6, at 1. 5% had a case plan of long term foster care
and 5% had a case goal of emancipation.
179. One study found that the predominant individual-level factors leading to an APPLA
designation include youth factors such as resistance to adoption and challenging mental health and
behavioral issues, including juvenile delinquency and teen pregnancy. Family-level factors were
birth parents’ inability or unwillingness to reunify; difficulty locating relatives and hesitancy of
relatives to become involved in the foster care system. Karen W. Tao, et al., Improving
Permanency: Caseworker Perspectives of Older Youth in Another Planned Permanent Living
Arrangement, 30 CHILD ADOLESCENT SOCIAL WORK JOURNAL 217, 224 (2013).
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C. Post-Termination Permanency Goal Under The Adoption and Safe
Families Act
The ASFA requires the court find that reasonable efforts to finalize a
permanency plan have been made.180 Establishing a “post-termination
reunification” permanency goal would require judges to make inquiries about
the appropriateness of reuniting the youth with his biological parent and
appropriateness of the agencies’ efforts to achieve that goal. Reasonable efforts
to accomplish a post-termination reunification goal would include locating the
parents, accessing their suitability for reunification and providing necessary
services to help them ameliorate any barriers to reunification. Also, the agency
would be required to provide visitation to the parent so that the relationship with
the child can be reestablished. Lastly, vacating the termination order or seeking
to reinstate parental rights would be necessary.
This new permanency goal would be preferred over APPLA. Therefore,
before an APPLA goal could be established, the ASFA should require courts to
make specific findings as to why “post-termination reunification” is not
appropriate. Currently, the ASFA requires that, prior to setting APPLA as a
goal, the court find “compelling reasons” why reunification, adoption,
guardianship and relative placement are not in the child’s best interest.” Such
compelling reasons include circumstances when an older teen specifically
requests emancipation as his or her permanency plan or when child has a
significant bond to a parent unable to care for the child because of an emotional
or physical disability. In respect to post-termination reunification, compelling
reasons would include circumstances when parental rights have not been
terminated, the birth parent has not rehabilitated and an older youth does not
wish to be reunited with his parent.
The court could further point to circumstances that would exempt the
agency from making reasonable efforts to achieve reunification at the onset of
the case. The ASFA permits the court to waive reasonable efforts to reunify
when certain aggravating circumstances exist.181 Similarly, the Minnesota
legislature included in its reinstatement statute two conditions in which parents
will not be able to reestablish their rights: when rights were terminated due to
sexual abuse or conduct resulting in the death of a minor, and when the parent
has been convicted of any crime that falls under the definition of “egregious
harm” (e.g. felony malicious punishment or sex trafficking of a minor).182
Although the ASFA waives the reasonable effort requirement when “the parent
has previously had parental rights to another child involuntarily terminated,” this
would not be a sufficient reason for not ordering post-termination reunification.
To apply this justification, the court would need to make a determination that

180. 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b)(2) (2015).
181. 45 C.F.R. 1356.21(b)(3)(i)–(iii) (2015).
182. MINN. STAT. § 260C.329(4) (2013).
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the parent had not resolved the issues that led to the termination of her parental
rights to the sibling.183
Once “post-termination reunification” has been established as the goal, the
court would be required to appoint or re-appoint counsel for the parent and child
and grant the parent party status. Within the dependency proceeding, any party
would have standing to file a petition to reinstate parental rights or a motion to
vacate the underlying neglect case. In states with reinstatement statutes, a
hearing would then be held to determine whether the parent has met the
applicable legal standard to have rights restored. In states without reinstatement
statutes, a hearing would be held to determine whether the original termination
order should be vacated based on post-judgment evidence.184
Once parental rights are reinstated, the parent and child should be eligible
for supportive services to prevent the reunification from disrupting.
“Reunification, although a positive milestone for the family, is also a time of
readjustment, and a family already under stress can have difficulty maintaining
safety and stability.”185 While some reinstatement statutes currently require a
period of monitoring after parental rights have been restored and after the child
has been placed in the home, others do not.186 “Families being ‘restored’ need
assistance with housing, child care or substance abuse treatment to avoid
breaking down because of the same poverty-related or other risk factors which
resulted in a termination in the first instance. As a result, reinstatement is a
hollow promise, since families will face many of the strains and lack of resources
which led to their initial involvement with the child welfare system . . . . The
failure to provide parents whose rights are being reinstated with services is in
stark contrast to the treatment of adoptive families, who are entitled both to
services and financial assistance so they do not fail.”187
While parents who reunite with their children pre-termination are
oftentimes eligible for services after a child is returned,188 post-termination

183. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN., § 15-11-203(a)(8) (2014).
184. See, e.g., In re Darrell V., 284 A.D.2d 247, 247 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001), the foster
parent’s decision not to adopt within a year after the termination prompted the court to reevaluate
the best interests of the children. See also In re Alasha E., 8 A.D.3d 375, 375 (N.Y. App. Div.
2004) (describing how the biological mother’s progress towards overcoming barriers to
reunification served as the impetus for the court’s reconsideration); In re Tony H., 28 A.D.3d 379,
379 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (describing how the court’s decision was based on the inaction of the
foster parent and the positive steps that the birth parent had made); In re D.G., 583 A.2d 160, 169
(D.C. 1990) (describing how the appellate court vacated the termination order and remanded the
case when adoption was no longer a realistic possibility).
185. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 132, at 11.
186. Oklahoma and Washington authorize or require a trial home visit of up to six months
before a final order of reinstatement may be granted. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-4-909(I)
(2014) and WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.215(9) (2011).
187. Godsoe, supra note 90, at 38.
188. See, for example, Michigan's Family Reunification Program, which provides four to six
months of services to strengthen families and reduce the need for children to reenter foster care.
Family Reunification Program, MICH. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.michigan.
gov/mdhhs/0,5885,7-339-73971_7119_7210-282166--,00.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2015).
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reunification must receive the same type and level of support. In fact, it is
arguable that these parents need more supportive services because (1) the youth
are older, (2) the parent and child have been separated for longer periods of time,
and (3) the youth may have psychological issues stemming from the
termination.189 “Research suggests that follow-up services that enhance
parenting skills, provide social support, connect families to basic resources, and
address children’s behavioral and emotional needs must be provided if reentry
into foster care is to be prevented.”190
VI.

CONCLUSION

Creating a process by which terminated parents can restore their parental
rights and be reunited with their biological children is not merely a matter of
public policy. United States Supreme Court cases examining the rights of
parents vis-à-vis their biological children provide constitutional underpinning to
argue that permitting post-termination reunification is required. Specifically,
the Supreme Court’s holding in Lehr v. Robertson suggests that parents, even
after a judicial order of termination, retain an opportunity interest in their
biological children. By challenging the prevailing notion that parents become
legal strangers to their children once parental rights are terminated, an argument
can be made that terminated parents have a constitutional right to posttermination reunification once it has been determined that their child will not be
adopted.
Currently, the foster care system, as a whole, has no established mechanism
for addressing and permitting placement with rehabilitated biological parents
after their parental rights have been terminated. Although reinstatement statutes
are a promising approach, the effectiveness of these statutes has been hampered
by laws and policies that undermine their goal of providing permanence for legal
orphans. Amending these statutes, in addition to providing policy support,
would benefit foster care youth and help ensure that they do not exit the system
without permanent legal connections. To ensure that states consider terminated
parents as placement resources when it is the child’s best interest, the federal
Adoption and Safe Families Act should also be amended to include posttermination reunification as a permanency goal. This amendment would also
create the necessary process for a biological parent to “re-grasp” her retained
opportunity interest, when in the best interest of her child.
Had the court been required to recognize the relationship between Ms.
Fugate and her daughter, Selina’s life might have been very different. After her
mother’s bid for custody was denied, Selina continued to move from foster home
to foster home, eventually being sent to boot camp after an altercation with a

189. See Patrick Parkinson, Child Protection, Permanency Planning and Children’s Right to
Family Life, 17 INT’L J. L. POL’Y & FAM. 147, 159 (2003) (noting that being ‘freed’ for adoption,
but ‘not chosen’ is one of the worst possible outcomes for children because it in limbo and is likely
to undermine any sense of permanence or security for these children).
190. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 132, at 11.
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caseworker.191 At age eighteen, she was informed that she had been
emancipated – no longer a ward of the state. “‘When it happened, I was terrified.
I didn’t know the first thing about being on my own. I’ve slept under bridges
and [in] abandoned building, outside on park benches. And so there were some
nights when I just didn’t sleep.”192 With no legal connections, Selina has “just
been struggling. You know, kind of lost.”193

191. Ohio AG Wants to Make it Easier for Foster Children to Make it On Their Own, WBNS10TV (Nov. 19, 2012, 6:38PM), http://www.10tv.com/content/stories/2012/11/19/columbusfoster-care-system-changes.html. See also Daniel A. Starett, A Plea for Permanence after
Termination of Parental Rights: Protecting the Best Interests of the Child in Ohio, 56 Clev. St. L.
Rev. 419 (2008).
192. Id.
193. Id.
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APPENDEX

NUMBER OF LEGAL ORPHANS194 BY STATE WITH
REINSTATEMENT STATUTE (LISTED IN ORDER OF
ENACTMENT)195

STATE

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Cal.
Nev.
Wash.
La.
Okla.
Ill.
N.Y.
Haw.
Alaska
Me.
N.C.
Va.
Del.
Utah
Minn.
Ga.
Colo.

10197
728
1810
809
1892
2811
4987
945
104
704
1654
942
141
142
1277
1409
988

10842
810
1933
722
2127
2,545
4622
778
254
623
1637
966
155
194
1186
1570
1322

10644
766
2121
789
3651
2477
4308
695
268
571
1750
992
143
258
1332
1708
1086

9836
884
2406
749
2547
2657
3947
545
431
561
1612
1372
175
360
1189
1639
1131

12035
1306
2139
755
2294
2472
3470
414
432
514
1499
1098
143
338
1138
872
1261

12091
1297
1784
750
1919
2746
3421
314
430
494
1274
1327
149
311
1,007
838
777

6920
1241
1360
820
1871
2970
3406
272
380
452
1169
1007
145
339
907
845
587

6195
821
1337
692
1609
2694
3119
205
330
413
1047
1140
148
307
953
902
543

6094
689
1500
568
1757
2839
2852
138
417
512
990
1085
113
329
1021
819
490

194. AFCARS REPORT #21, supra note 6. This number does not include youth 16 years old
and older whose parents’ parental rights have been terminated and who have a goal of
emancipation. Thus, legal orphans who are in most need of services are not included.
195. Bolded year is year of enactment of the statute. Data for 2014-present is currently
unavailable.
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B. OPPORTUNITY INTERESTS, PARENTAL RIGHTS, AND
RESIDUAL PARENTAL RIGHTS
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C. THE OPPORTUNITY INTEREST RETAINED BY TERMINATED
PARENTS

63

ADAMS - (RE-)GRASPING THE OPPORTUNITY INTEREST

64

(DO NOT DELETE)

KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y

12/18/2015 6:50 PM

[ Vol. XXV:1

